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Individual freedom finds tangible expression
in property rights.'
Men must turn square corners when they
deal with the Government.
2
I. AN INTRODUCTION To A WORLD WHERE GUILT OR
INNOCENCE IS IRRELEVANT; ALL THAT MATTERS IS How
MUCH YOUR PROPERTY IS WORTH
Imagine owning an expensive piece of property, a piece of real
estate perhaps, or maybe a car or boat. Now imagine having your
property forcefully taken away from you because someone suspects, or
pretends to suspect, that you are using the property in the commission
of criminal acts. Then, imagine having to hire a lawyer and start a
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1. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (1993).
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Rock Island,
Arkansas & Louisiana R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
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lawsuit to recover your property. After spending a small fortune in
legal fees to recover your own property, imagine you lose your lawsuit,
not because you could not prove your rightful ownership before its
forceful seizure, but because you could not prove that the person who
seized the property lacked a reasonable suspicion that you were using
the property in the commission of criminal acts or that you were not
in fact using the property in the commission of criminal acts. Finally,
imagine that your only recourse is buying your property back from the
person who took it.
Not likely to happen in America? Think again. It might not be
likely to happen in America if a private party forcefully seized your
property. But if your own government took it, you are in deep trouble.
This is, in fact, what is happening all over America thanks to 21
U.S.C. § 881' (Section 881), the civil forfeiture statute, and other state
and federal forfeiture provisions.
4
3. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
4. Section 881(a) declares simply that the following is subject to forfeiture and that no
property rights exist in these items:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed,
or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances, induding aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9),
except that-
(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction
of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section
unless it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance was
a consenting party or privy to a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter;
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by
reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed
or omitted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully
in the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of
the United States, or of any State; and
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner.
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and
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Government touches virtually all things in the United States and,
eventually, injures almost everything it touches. This Article explores
the constitutional infirmities of Section 881 in light of the government
depredations it has prompted. In particular, the Article examines the
significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. United
States.5
In Austin, the Supreme Court imposed a substantive restriction on
governments' forfeiture powers based on the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause.6 However, Austin did not define the exact
parameters of this restriction. Given governments' tendencies to abuse
the powers granted to them, courts should follow the interpretation of
Austin that results in the greatest restriction on their forfeiture powers.
This Article suggests an explanation of Austin that would severely
restrict these powers, at least those of the United States government.
The case of Donald Scott is a good example of the threat to
individual freedom posed by the forfeiture laws and the need for a
more restrictive interpretation of governments' forfeiture powers. Mr.
Scott owned a 200-acre ranch in the Ventura County portion of
Malibu, California, adjacent to the Santa Monica Mountains National
Recreation Area. The property, worth approximately $3-5 million,
all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improve-
ments, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to
the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by
that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner.
(8) All controlled substances which have been possessed in violation of this
subchapter.
(9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines,
all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, which have been imported,
exported, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or intended to be distributed, imported,
or exported, in violation of a felony provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter.
(10) Any drug paraphernalia (as defined in section 857 of this title).
(11) Any firearm (as defined in section 921 of Title 18) used or intended to be used
to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property
described in paragraph (1) or (2) and any proceeds traceable to such property.
Id. § 881(a).
5. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
6. Id. at 2803.
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attracted the attention of no less then seven governmental agencies' in
the months leading up to Mr. Scott's death at the hands of Los
Angeles Sheriffs Department (LASD) deputies attempting to serve a
search warrant on Mr. Scott.' No one of these seven agencies had
primary jurisdiction over the situs of Mr. Scott's ranch.'
After thoroughly investigating the Scott death, Ventura County
District Attorney Michael D. Bradbury concluded that the search
warrant was defective.'0 The warrant was issued based on a DEA
agent's claim that, using binoculars from the air, he spotted marijuana
being cultivated on the property.1 In fact, however, the DEA agent
did not use binoculars to spot marijuana; he used his bare eyes.' 2
The judge who issued the warrant was not told that the DEA agent
was initially reluctant to allow his observation to serve as the sole basis
of the warrant.13 Nor was he told that the DEA agent was flying at
1,000 feet when he spotted the marijuana 4 by looking for distinctive
shades of green.' Further, the judge was not told that the LASD
unsuccessfully attempted to verify the presence of marijuana cultivation
on the Scott property from the ground, that the United States Border
Patrol had made two incursions onto the property in a similar attempt
7. Michael D. Bradbury, Report on the Death of Donald Scott, Office of the District
Attorney, County of Ventura, California 2-15 (Mar. 30, 1993) (unpublished report, on file with
the Seattle University Law Review).
8. Participating in the service of the search warrant were the LASD, the Los Angeles Police
Department, the National Guard, the National Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service, the
California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Id. at 15. Two
of the representatives from the LASD were from the asset forfeiture unit. Id. All of this despite
the opinion of one Los Angeles Sheriffs Deputy who had visited the Scott ranch that the Scotts
posed a minimal threat. Id. at 12.
9. See id. at 15-16.
10. Id. at 48.
11. Id. at 12-13.
12. Id. at 44.
13. Id. at 9. It was not until the DEA agent received information that a confidential
informant had seen marijuana plants growing on the property and that the expected yield of the
plants was approximately forty pounds that he consented to allow his observations to provide the
basis for the warrant. Id. at 2, 9. That informant later denied having stated that a yield of forty
pounds was expected. Id. at 47.
14. Id. at 45, 47.
15. Id. at 38, 45. As outlined in author Michael Bradbury's report, the likelihood of spotting
marijuana from 1,000 feet with the bare eye is small. See id. at 28, 37-39. The California courts
have previously addressed claims like the one advanced by the DEA agent that marijuana has a
color that is unique to nature. Id. at 38. The law on this point in California is decidedly against
the validity of a probable cause determination based on such a claim alone. See id. The Ventura
County District Attorney interviewed a Forest Service ranger who had spent hundreds of hours
doing aerial surveillance, and his conclusion was that the likelihood that the DEA agent's claim
was valid is similar to the claim of "seeing a corn dog sticking out of the ground" at 1,000 feet.
Id. at 28.
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but was unable to verify marijuana cultivation on the property, and
that National Park Service and LASD personnel visited the property
under false pretenses and were also unable to verify marijuana
cultivation on the Scott ranch.' 6
In his report, the Ventura County District Attorney concluded
that a motivating factor behind the service of the search warrant was
the possible forfeiture of the Scott ranch to government authorities. 7
Mr. Bradbury speculated that when the LASD learned of Scott's wife's
marijuana possession conviction, sheriffs deputies arranged to search
the property, aware that if marijuana was found growing on the
property, or if other drugs were found in sufficient quantity, a valuable
piece of property could be forfeited to the government." Mr.
Bradbury further speculated that the Ventura County Sheriffs
Department, which had primary jurisdiction over the geographic area,
was not notified of the service of the warrant "because Los Angeles
County did not want to split the forfeiture proceeds with [Ventura
County]."' 9
Most importantly, the Ventura County District Attorney's report
concluded that "[t]here would have been no legal impropriety [in
forfeiture being one of the motivating factors for obtaining and serving
the search warrant] under existing law if the search warrant had been
supported by probable cause."20 In other words, the only error of the
LASD and its deputies was their failure to secure a valid warrant for
their search.
The Scott case amply demonstrates the perverse incentives put in
place by the forfeiture laws. When authorities happen upon valuable
property in the hands of potential criminals, their incentive is to
discover sufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing to undergird a
valid search warrant so the property can be forfeited to the govern-
ment. This perverse incentive exists because the focus of a forfeiture
investigation is entirely on the determination of probable cause, not on
the actual commission of wrongdoing. If the government meets a
relatively easy burden of probable cause, the property will be forfeited
unless the property owner, the claimant, can prove his or her inno-
cence.
16. Id. at 3-9.
17. Id. at 62. At the briefing before service of the warrant, forfeiture of the Scott ranch was
discussed. Id. at 16. An LASD deputy stated that the ranch would be seized if more than
fourteen marijuana plants were found on the property. Id.
18. Id. at 61.
19. Id. at 51.
20. Id. at 34.
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In another demonstration of the gross excesses in which govern-
ment may indulge in this modern age, the Office of Thrift Supervision
of Resolution Trust Corporation (OTS) proceeded against the
prominent and famous law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays, &
Handler (Kaye Scholer) in March 1992.21 Kaye Scholer was charged
with withholding information secured from its client, Lincoln Savings
& Loan Association, a failed thrift. The charges against Kaye Scholer
were accompanied by an unprecedented, draconian asset freeze-a
unilateral, no court-consideration freeze 22-based upon a single
government agency finding that the law firm had failed to comply with
a subpoena about its finances and had threatened to amend its liability
insurance policy so as to prejudice OTS's ability to recover restitu-
tion.23
The idea that Kaye Scholer would engage in such behavior was,
and is, ridiculous. It was an obvious pretext to impose the freeze
against the entire firm. 4  The Wall Street Journal justly called this
freeze a "terrifying trump card."25 "[C]lients got fidgety and banks
questioned the firm's ability to repay loans. '2 6 Obviously, the freeze
was deliberately intended by the OTS to coerce Kaye Scholer to settle
the charges without defending the basic claim.27 The intention
succeeded because the firm, unable to function under the freeze order,
could not continue in existence long enough for the charges to be
adjudicated.28
The New York City Bar Association concluded: "[The] OTS
confronted the firm with the choice of settling promptly or going out
of business. The effect of this order apparently has been to deprive
Kaye Scholer of its right to defend itself in court on the merits.
29
21. Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, How a Big Law Firm Was Brought to Knees by Zealous
Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al.
22. Andrew J. Maloney, Kaye Scholer Bullied by a Powerful OTS, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,
1993, at A9 (Letter to the Editor).
23. See The Committee on Professional Responsibility, Attachment of Law Firm Assets by
Federal Regulatory Agencies, The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
118 (Mar. 1992) [hereinafter Attachment of Law Firm Assets].
24. See id. at 118-19 (recognizing that government regulators may use the power to freeze
assets not to prevent their dissipation, but rather to force a law firm to settle regardless of the
merits).
25. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 21, at Al.
26. Id.
27. Maloney, supra note 22, at A9; see Arkansas Forbearance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994,
at A20.
28. See Stevens & Thomas, supra note 21, at AS.
29. Conrad K. Harper, Preface to Attachment of Law Firm Assets, supra note 23, at 116.
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The firm had little choice but to fork over a $41 million settlement.
The alternative was bankruptcy.3 °
The OTS apparently assumed that Kaye Scholer's duty was to
ignore attorney-client privilege and volunteer information it had
secured from its client that was "of interest" to the OTS or to Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) examiners.31 The OTS's position
required Kaye Scholer to divulge even negative information about its
client whether responsive to any particular inquiry or not.32
Kaye Scholer asserted that its statements to the FHLBB examiners
were truthful, and that to simply volunteer information just because it
might be of "interest" to the bank examiners was directly in violation
of its responsibilities to a client under the canons of ethics.33 The
duty of inquiry on which the OTS charges were based would not only
require lawyers to overstep the scope of their representation but would
also make any relationship of trust between lawyers and their clients
an impossibility.34 Even heinous serial murderers are entitled to
counsel. Even Charles Keating, owner of Lincoln Savings & Loan
Association, who apparently purchased 5% of the Senate of the United
States,3 5 is entitled to counsel of undivided loyalty.36
Professor Geoffrey Hazard37 concurred that the OTS misunder-
stood a lawyer's ethical responsibilities in representing a client who is
under investigation by a banking agency.3" He concluded that "Kaye
Scholer did not violate existing standards of ethical conduct and
professional responsibility, and ... acted in accordance with its duties
under the law."39 He also announced that "[t]he disclosures .. .that
... [the] OTS alleges should have been made.., by Kaye Scholer in
fact would have violated the standards of ethical conduct and profes-
30. See Attachment of Law Firm Assets, supra note 23, at 119-20.
31. See Maloney, supra note 22, at A9.
32. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 21, at Al.
33. Id. at A5.
34. See Harper, supra note 29, at 116.
35. Senators McCain (R. Ariz.), De Concini (D. Ariz.), Riegle (D. Mich.), Glenn (D. Ohio),
and Cranston (D. Cal.) each secured large campaign contributions from Keating or his thrift while
the senators pressured regulators to keep the thrift open. See Charles Keating's Lasting Taint,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993, at A28; Martin Tolchin, Michigan Senator in Savings Scandal Will
Retire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A16; Richard L. Berke, Aftermath of the Keating Verdicts,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at A22.
36. See Letter Clearing Lincoln S & L Lawyer, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 27, 1993-Jan. 3, 1994, at
10 (reprinting letter written by Hal R. Lieberman).
37. Summary of the Expert Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (Feb. 25, 1992) [hereinafter
Hazard] (on fle with the Seattle University Law Review).
38. See id. at 17-19.
39. Id. at 18-19.
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sional responsibility generally recognized as applicable to Kaye Scholer
in its role as litigation counsel."4
The American Bar Association (ABA) appointed a select Working
Group on Lawyers' Representation of Regulated Clients (Working
Group) to study the Kaye Scholer matter.4 The Working Group's
report vigorously criticized the OTS and recommended action to stop
government agencies from abusing this kind of power in the future.42
The Working Group concluded that the OTS's standards of lawyer
conduct go beyond, and conflict with, traditional and current standards
of professional responsibility.
43
The OTS justified these novel standards by asserting that Kaye
Scholer had disclosure obligations previously unheard of for lawyers
because the firm interpositioned itself between the OTS and Lincoln,
thus "making itself the 'sole agent' for the thrift."' 44 This "interposi-
tion" theory was most likely an after-the-fact justification for the
OTS's charges. After being apprised of OTS's interposition theory,
Kaye Scholer submitted a memorandum to the Working Group that
documented numerous direct contacts between the regulators and the
client, establishing that the regulators had full access to the client
directly.45
New York's Departmental Disciplinary Committee instituted its
own investigation of the OTS's charges. 46  After a lengthy proceed-
ing, the Disciplinary Committee found "no basis" for taking any
disciplinary action against the Kaye Scholer partners for violation of
professional ethics." Because no violation of professional ethics was
found, and the FHLBB regulations governing the conduct of lawyers
incorporate these professional ethics standards," Kaye Scholer was
vindicated.49
40. Id. at 19.
41. Maloney, supra note 22, at A9. ABA working groups typically consist of distinguished
lawyers from private practice and from government and non-profit agencies.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 21, at AS.
45. Maloney, supra note 22, at A9. For a detailed accounting of the contacts between
Lincoln and the regulators, see Hazard, supra note 37.
46. Letter Clearing Lincoln S & L Lawyer, supra note 36, at 10.
47. Id.
48. Hazard, supra note 37, at 17.
49. The Disciplinary Committee itself emphasized how squarely its conclusion contradicted
the OTS: "Finally, it is significant that the OTS gave us access to its complete document files,
and thus we reviewed every document which OTS presumably would have used (at least in
connection with the issues we investigated) had its action against Kaye, Scholer resulted in actual
litigation before a tribunal." Letter Clearing Lincoln S & L Lawyer, supra note 36, at 10.
[Vol. 19:1
Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment
Clearly a serious violation of the canons of ethics occurred in the
Kaye Scholer matter, but the violation was by the OTS's lawyers, not
Kaye Scholer. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
"a government lawyer . . .should not use his or her position or the
economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about
unjust settlements or results.""0 The OTS unilaterally imposed the
freeze order based on false allegations of the dissipation of assets. This
imposition injured hundreds of partners and associates of active defense
firms. OTS's intent to coerce Kaye Scholer to settle insupportable
charges patently violates the canons of ethics.
The apparently impartial and thorough work of the ABA and the
New York State Disciplinary Committee corrected an injustice and
helped to restore the reputations of Kaye Scholer and its partners. The
bar, the bench, and society should take steps to ensure that the
government lawyers who abused their positions are proceeded against;
outrages like this cannot be suffered to occur. Finally, this incident
affords an example of the perfidy and the depths to which it is possible
for government to sink.
II. CIVIL FORFEITURE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Currently, forfeiture statutes in the United States are myriad at
the federal level."' State forfeiture laws vary even more than federal
50. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1990).
51. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3373-3374 (West Supp. 1985) (any fish, wildlife, or plants
imported, exported, transported, sold, received, acquired, or purchased in violation of United
States Treaty or any Indian tribal law subject to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-474, 492 (West
1976 & Supp. 1995) (counterfeit or fraudulent obligations, securities, counterfeit plates, or stones
of the United States are forfeit); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 476-477, 492 (West 1976 & Supp. 1995)
(impressions or tools used to make counterfeit objects are forfeit); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 478-481, 492
(West 1976 & Supp. 1995) (counterfeit or fraudulent foreign securities or obligations and the tools
to make them are forfeit); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 485-488, 492 (West 1976 & Supp. 1995) (counterfeit
coins or bars, foreign or domestic, are subject to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 492, 501-502 (West
1976 & Supp. 1995) (all counterfeit postage subject to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. § 542 (West Supp.
1995) (entry of goods by means of false statements are subject to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. § 545
(West Supp. 1995) (smuggled goods are subject to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 656-657, 982(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1995) (embezzled funds from a federally insured bank are subject to forfeiture); 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 842, 844 (West 1976 & Supp. 1995) (unlawful explosives are subject to forfeiture);
18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1995) (any property traceable to offense against a foreign
nation involving manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of controlled substances is subject
to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 982(2)(A), 1014 (West Supp. 1995) (proceeds from fraudulently
overvaluing loan and credit applications are subject to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 982(2)(B), 1028
(West Supp. 1995) (fraudulent identification documents are subject to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 982(2)(B), 1029-1030 (West Supp. 1995) (funds defrauded from access devices or computers
are subject to forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 982(2)(A), 1344 (West Supp. 1995) (funds obtained as
a result of bank fraud are subject to forfeiture); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2093 (West 1980) (any pre-
Columbian monumental sculpture or mural unlawfully imported into the United States is subject
1995]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 19:1
forfeiture laws. 2 However, states generally have either code provi-
to forfeiture); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West Supp. 1995) (all property constituting, or derived from,
any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of a violation of federal drug laws is
subject to forfeiture); 22 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 1990) (war materials exported in violation of law
subject to forfeiture); 22 U.S.C.A. § 1978(e) (West 1990) (fish products from countries violating
international programs against overfishing subject to forfeiture); 50 U.S.C.A. § 212 (West 1991)
(property used in aid of insurrection subject to confiscation); see also 40 C.F.R. § 85.1513(c)
(1994) (vehicles or engines imported into the United States without a certificate from the U.S.
Customs Service certifying catalyst and 02 sensor equipment may be subject to seizure).
52. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-8-86 (1989) (vehicles in which identification numbers appear
to be altered and ownership cannot be determined are subject to forfeiture); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.46.487 (1989) (personal property, other than a motor vehicle, used to aid in the disregarding
of a highway obstruction is forfeit upon conviction of the disregarding); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-817 (1992) (obscene motion picture films and publications are contraband and forfeit); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-73-110 (Michie 1993) (deadly weapons seized from mentally defective minor are
subject to forfeiture at the discretion of the court); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 12157 (West
Supp. 1995) (devices and apparatus designed to be, capable of being used, or used to take birds,
mammals, fish, amphibia, or reptiles in violation of code subject to forfeiture upon conviction);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-13- 303(1), (3) (West 1990) (vehicles constituting a public nuisance
are forfeit); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-397(aX1) (West 1994) (cash proceeds and property
derived from illegal racketeering activity are forfeit); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1308 (1993) (value
of imported or infested agricultural nursery stock is forfeit); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.413(6)(e)
(West 1993) (cranes and winches found unlawfully dumping more than 500 pounds or 100 cubit
feet of litter are forfeit); GA. CODE ANN. § 68A-902.4 (Harrison Supp. 1993) (motor vehicle used
by person who has been declared an habitual violator, whose license has been revoked, and who
has been arrested for driving while under the influence is forfeit); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-
8204 (Michie 1994) (cable television devices used in cable television services fraud subject to
forfeiture); IDAHO CODE § 52-415 (1994) (all personal property declared to be a moral nuisance
as per code is subject to forfeiture); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 25/4.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(proceeds from illegal bingo are forfeit); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-13-4(d) (Bums 1990) (vehicles
used to transport hazardous waste in the commission of a crime are subject to forfeiture); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2512(b) (1988) (devices used for gambling purposes are forfeit); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40.991 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (filing of fraudulent claims or assisting in the
filing of fraudulent claims for Vietnam veteran's bonus subjects bonus to forfeiture); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. 14:102.2(B) (West 1986) (animals subjected to cruel treatment are subject to
forfeiture); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4373 (West 1990) (unstamped cigarettes are subject
to forfeiture); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 5-905 (1995) (antifouling paint subject to forfeiture);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, § 710 (West 1991) (recreational tramway ticket subject to
forfeiture upon skier's failure to heed warnings of ski area operator); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 289.37 (West Supp. 1995) (condemned food products are subject to forfeiture); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-111 (Supp. 1995) (vehicle used in drive-by shooting or bombing is subject to
forfeiture); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.030-050 (Vernon 1995) (bears, bulls, cocks, and other
creatures used in fighting or baiting activities are subject to forfeiture); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-
12-102 (1995) (funds, raw materials, products, and equipment used in violation of controlled
substance act are subject to forfeiture); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-431 (1989) (controlled substances
are forfeit); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:18 (1989) (equipment used in the unlawful taking of
fish is subject to forfeiture); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:64-1.a.(1) (West 1995) (prima facie
contraband subject to forfeiture); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-45-7 (Michie 1978) (all equipment,
including computers, used in violation of the Computer Crimes Act is subject to forfeiture); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106-202.20 (Supp. 1994) (illegally possessed plants are subject to forfeiture); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 62.1-05-01 (1985) (machines guns, automatic rifles, silencers and bombs are
subject to forfeiture); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4969.22 (Anderson 1991) (railroads' right of way
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sions or judicial decisions that require forfeiture laws to be read nar-
rowly. A few states, like Wyoming, have very few forfeiture laws; in
such states, the few laws that exist are not always readily discoverable.
A. A History of Forfeiture
Historically, the State or Nation or whatever entity inherited the
authority of the King in the area of forfeiture had the authority to
proceed directly against certain things. This is the action stricti juris
in rem, to be distinguished from actions quasi in rem53 and in perso-
nam.54  In actions stricti juris in rem, the State has authority, within
certain strictures,55 and in certain instances, to "condemn" property.
For instance, rotten beef can be seized, impounded, and destroyed in
exercise of the public authority and the police power-to protect
populations from pestilence or olfactory offense. 6 Heroin and other
forfeit after 10 years of nonuse); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 4-129.L.1 (West Supp. 1996)
(mussels harvested in violation of code are subject to forfeiture); OR. REV. STAT. § 323.245
(1993) (vending machines that sell cigarettes upon which tax was not paid are subject to
forfeiture); S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-11-740 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994) (vehicles, animals, and
firearms used in hunting bear or deer at night subject to forfeiture); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 1-20-35 (1992) (findings resulting from unauthorized archaeological dig are subject to forfeiture);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-415 (1995) (exotic animals taken in contravention of code are subject
to forfeiture); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 77.027 (West Supp. 1995) (proceeds from sale
of illegally harvested shrimp subject to forfeiture); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-301.6 (1995) (dogs
engaged in dog fighting exhibition are subject to forfeiture); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 3315 (1988)
(livestock products and poultry products used or found in violation of safety laws subject to
seizure and condemnation); VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-407 (Michie 1992) (furs obtained in violation
of code are forfeit); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.81.050 (1994) (all funds, books, records, and files of
every kind and all other property belonging to a subversive organization are forfeited to the state);
W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50(d)(5) (Supp. 1995) (target medium of unauthorized transfer of sound
recordings subject to forfeiture); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.24 (West 1982) (switchblades must be
surrendered to any peace officer); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 33, § 1581 (1994) (any property, including
draft animals, used to transport articles in violation of the tax code is forfeit).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. a (1982) (explaining distinction
between in rern and quasi in rem proceedings).
54. Id. § 5 (explaining scope of in personam jurisdiction).
55. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950); see also Doersan v. Brescher, 468 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
hearsay may not form the basis for trier-of-fact's determination that forfeited property was utilized
in commission of crime); State v. Matheason, 84 Wash. 2d 130, 134, 524 P.2d 388, 390 (1974)
(finding statute that provided for seizure of vehicle used to transport proscribed marijuana invalid
because it did not provide for notice and hearing to property owner even after seizure).
56. See North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); see also
United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef Weighing Approx. 154,121 Pounds, 516 F. Supp. 321
(D. Kan. 1981), affd, 726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984); United States
v. 500 Pounds, More or Less, of Veal and Beef, 319 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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prohibited substances can also be seized 7 and destroyed."8 In these
instances, the thing proceeded against is offensive in and of itself.59
In other cases, the thing is not itself a danger, an offense, or a
threat, but is used in connection with the violation of a law. For
example, a ship that indulges in acts of piratical depredations may be
forfeited.6 ° Or a ship engaged to scoop oysters from oyster beds,
however efficient, may be condemned because the public authority has
acted to protect the resource. 6' Similarly, a ship apprehended in the
transport of marijuana may be seized,62 and an automobile carrying
prohibited alcohol may be apprehended and condemned.63
In the Mosaic law, it was laid down: "If an ox gore a man or a
woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh
shall not be eaten ... 64 Similarly, the English law of deodand
57. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); accord United States v.
Martino, 664 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110 (1982); United States v. Allard,
600 F.2d 1301 (9th Cit. 1979); United States v. Glasby, 576 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 854 (1978); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cit. 1972).
58. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.21 (1995). In Glennon v. Britton, the court noted:
The object of the proceedings to be instituted under the statute is that the unlawful and
immoral practice be stopped, by destroying implements, apparatus, materials, etc., with
which it is carried on. The theory is, in respect of such property, that no one is longer
the owner of it. The moment it is used and applied in the unlawful business, it
becomes liable to forfeiture; and, though the claimant may appear and claim, he has no
greater rights in property so used than has any other person. ... And, for the
promotion of the general welfare, the state, under its police powers, has the undoubted
right to adopt the most expeditious, inexpensive, and effective mode of abolishing and
abating the same. That, under the various acts of congress, goods and things are seized,
condemned, and destroyed ... and such statutes, and proceedings under them, [have
been] regarded constitutional and valid.
40 N.E. 594, 598 (Ill. 1895); see also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (upholding seizure
and destruction of fish nets used in violation of state statute); People v. One Pinball Machine, 44
N.E.2d 950, 957 (Ill. App. Ct. 1942) (upholding right to destroy pinball machine used as
gambling device).
59. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); see also
United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 454 (7th Cit. 1980) ("The vehicle
or other inanimate object is treated as being itself guilty of wrongdoing, regardless of its owner's
conduct.").
60. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 7 (1827); United States v. The Cargo of
the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 209 (1844).
61. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
62. E.g., United States v. One (1) 1983, Fifty-seven Foot (57') Gulfstream Vessel, 640 F.
Supp. 667 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974); United States v. One 55 Foot Fishing Vessel, 656 F. Supp. 967, 968 (D. Mass. 1987)
("Where a conveyance such as a vessel is used or intended to be used to transport a controlled
substance such as marijuana, it is subject to forfeiture.").
63. See, e.g., United States v. One 1950 Ford Half-Ton Pickup Automobile Truck, 195 F.2d
857, 859-60 (6th Cit. 1952) (holding that automobile used to transport owner to and from site
of illegally operated still was subject to forfeiture proceedings under the Internal Revenue Code).
64. Exodus 21:28.
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presupposed that if any property should cause the death of a human
being, that property was forfeited to the Crown. The negligence or
fault of the owner was irrelevant. The property was forfeited, and the
King would use the proceeds from the property sale or give the
property to the survivors of the deceased.6" Perhaps owing to the
large number of deaths caused by the industrial revolution, the concept
of deodands was abolished in England in 1846,66 and Parliament
adopted the Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by
Accidents.67 However, a case decided the same year continued the
rationale that property could be forfeited in the absence of the owner's
negligence.68
England did retain forfeiture law as applied to persons who
violated the customs and revenue laws. These actions were brought in
rem in the Court of Exchequer and reflected the belief that if a
property owner engaged in illegal conduct, the owner's property rights
should be taken away.69
English law undoubtedly had a strong influence on the develop-
ment of forfeiture doctrine in the United States. Although the
Supreme Court decided in rem proceedings with regard to State
mechanics' and provisioners' liens,7" The Palmyra71 was the first case
decided in which a ship was seized by the United States government
for violations of a piracy statute.72 The United States seized the ship
at sea, and the lower court ruled that the ship should be returned to its
owners. 73 The lower court based its decision on the argument that to
forfeit the ship through a proceeding in rem, a conviction in personam
should have been entered concerning a person." The Supreme Court
65. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 24-25 (3d ed. 1923); see also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299-300.
66. An Act to Abolish Deodands, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 62 (Eng.).
67. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (Eng.).
68. Regina v. Woodrow, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846).
69. For a complete history of early English forfeiture law, see generally HOLMES, supra note
65, at 1-38; Jacob J. Finklestein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973);
Leslie C. Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law and Policy: A Proposal for Reform, 19 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 661, 661-69 (1978); Stephen A. Youngman, Comment, Forfeiture of Aircraft Used in
Crimes-The Consequences to the Innocent Owner or Security Interest Holder, 49 J. AIR L. & COM.
989, 989-93 (1984).
70. Blaine v. The Ship Charles Carter, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 327 (1808); The General Smith,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819).
71. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
72. 3 Stat. 77 (1819); 3 Stat. 113 (1820).
73. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 2.
74. Id. at 5.
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disagreed and held that the ship should be forfeited. Justice Story
wrote for the Court:
[A]t the common law, in many cases of felony, the party forfeited
his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly
speaking, attach in rem; but it was part, or, at least, a consequence,
of the judgment of conviction. It is plain, from this statement that
no right to the goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by
the crown, by the mere commission of the offence; but the right at-
tached only by the conviction of the offender. The necessary result
was, that in every case where the crown sought to recover such
goods and chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right, by
producing the record of the judgment of conviction. In the
contemplation of the common law, the offender's right was not
divested, until the conviction. But this doctrine never was applied
to seizures and forfeitures created by statute, in rem, cognisable on
the revenue side of the exchequer. The thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached
primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offence be malum
prohibitum, or malum in se. The same principle applies to proceed-
ings in rem, on seizures in admiralty. Many cases exist, where the
forfeiture for acts done attaches solely in rem, and there is no
accompanying penalty in personam.7"
Thus, the Court defined the proceedings in rem against the ship as
separate and independent of any action against an owner, agent, or
employee.76
Property seizure and subsequent forfeiture, absent any wrongdoing
by the owner, has occurred frequently since The Palmyra. In Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States,77 the lessee of a distillery failed to keep
certain records and falsified others in violation of a statute.78 The
owner/lessor had no knowledge of the lessee's violations, yet the circuit
court ordered forfeiture of the property.79 The judgment was later
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court."
Again, in J.W Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,"' the
Supreme Court held that when a secured party sold an automobile to
an individual who was later apprehended for transporting untaxed
liquor in that automobile, the secured party forfeited his interest in the
75. Id. at 14.
76. See id.
77. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
78. Id. at 396.
79. See id. at 397.
80. Id. at 404.
81. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
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automobile.8 2 Although the secured party argued that the forfeiture
"deprived the . . . [c]ompany of its property without due process of
law" because the lessor was unaware of any wrongdoing,13 the Court
reasoned that the government's interest in enforcing the laws of the
United States outweighed the innocent owner's property interest.8 4
The Supreme Court further developed its rationale for allowing
the forfeiture of an innocent party's property in Van Oster v. Kan-
sas."5 In Van Oster, the Court held that the State of Kansas constitu-
tionally seized property that was used for the transportation of illegal
liquor.8
6
[C]ertain uses of property may be regarded as so undesirable that
the owner surrenders his control at his peril. The law thus builds
a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions
by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion
between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner.8 7
Since Van Oster, the objective of discouraging illegal uses of
property has led the Supreme Court to sustain other forfeiture statutes
against constitutional attack by distinguishing actions in rem from
actions in personam.88
B. Section 881
The federal government is authorized to initiate forfeiture
proceedings through numerous specific statutes. Many statutes provide
for civil actions in rem,8 9 although some statutes, such as the criminal
forfeiture statutes, require a person's conviction before that person's
property can be forfeited. The statutory scheme under Section 881,
relating to forfeitures associated with violations of current drug laws,
is a representative example of a civil forfeiture statute."
Section 881 provides an extensive list of the various types of
property subject to forfeiture92 and incorporates the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims procedures
82. Id. at 511-13.
83. Id. at 509.
84. See id. at 510.
85. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
86. Id. at 466, 469.
87. Id. at 467-68.
88. See Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 580 (1931).
89. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
90. See, e.g., id. §§ 848, 853.
91. See id. § 881.
92. See id.; supra note 4.
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governing the seizure of property. Property subject to forfeiture under
Section 881 may be seized upon service of process issued pursuant to
the Supplemental Rules.93 Section 881 also incorporates the enforce-
ment provisions of the customs laws94 relating to the following: the
seizure, summary, and judicial forfeiture of property; the disposition
of the property or proceeds of the property; the remission or mitigation
of forfeitures; and the compromise of claims, except to the extent those
provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 881.
Additionally, the duties imposed on customs officers, or other persons
under the enforcement provisions of the customs laws, shall be
performed by officers, agents, or other persons authorized or designat-
ed by the Attorney General, unless the actions arise from seizures and
forfeitures effected by customs officers.9 5
Under Section 881, property can be seized without process if the
Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property is
subject to civil forfeiture.96 Once a piece of property is seized, the
property is not repleviable but is deemed to be in the custody of the
Attorney General, subject only to orders of a court having jurisdiction
over the property.97
When the property is seized, a report is submitted to the United
States Attorney for the district where the alleged violation occurred. 98
93. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b) (West Supp. 1995).
94. The enforcement provisions of the customs laws can be found at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-
1619 (West Supp. 1995). The authorization for the application of the customs laws can be found
at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1600 (West Supp. 1995).
95. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(d) (West Supp. 1995) provides as follows:
The provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and
condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such
property or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the remission or mitigation of such
forfeitures; and the compromise of claims shall apply to seizures and forfeitures
incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under any of the provisions of this
subchapter, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof; except
that such duties as are imposed upon the customs officer or any other person with
respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property under the customs laws shall be
performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of property under this subchapter by
such officers, agents, or other persons as may be authorized or designated for that
purpose by the Attorney General, except to the extent that such duties arise from
seizures and forfeitures effected by any customs officer.
96. Id. § 881(b)(4).
97. Id. § 881(c).
98. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (West Supp. 1995), which pertains to the seizing officer's duty to
report the seizure to the appropriate customs officer, provides as follows:
It shall be the duty of any officer, agent, or other person authorized by law to make
seizures of merchandise or baggage subject to seizure for violation of the customs laws,
to report every such seizure immediately to the appropriate customs officer for the
district in which such violation occurred, and to turn over and deliver to such customs
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The property is then appraised at its domestic or market value.99 If
the seized property was used to import, export, transport, or store any
controlled substance, 100  forfeiture proceedings are commenced.'0 '
Notice of the seizure and the intent to forfeit the property is published
for at least three consecutive weeks. Written notice of the seizure, with
information about applicable procedures, is sent to each party who
officer any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage seized by him, and to report
immediately to such customs officer every violation of the customs laws.
19 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b) (West Supp. 1995), which pertains to the customs officer's duty to report
seizures to the United States attorney, provides as follows:
Whenever a seizure of merchandise for violation of the customs laws is made, or a
violation of the customs laws is discovered, and legal proceedings by the United States
attorney in connection with such seizure or discovery are required, it shall be the duty
of the appropriate customs officer to report promptly such seizure or violation to the
United States attorney for the district in which such violation has occurred, or in which
such seizure was made, and to include in such report a statement of all the facts and
circumstances of the case within his knowledge, with the names of the witnesses and a
citation to the statute or statutes believed to have been violated, and on which reliance
may be had for forfeiture or conviction.
Other relevant provisions include 19 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West Supp. 1995) (pertaining to the
United States Attorney General's duty to prosecute violations of the customs laws for recovery
of any fines, penalties, or forfeitures that were incurred by reason of such violations) and 19
U.S.C.A. § 1605 (West Supp. 1995) (pertaining to the storage of seized property pending
disposition according to law).
99. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1606 (West Supp. 1995) provides as follows: "The appropriate customs
officer shall determine the domestic value, at the time and place of appraisement, of any vessel,
vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage seized under the customs laws."
100. Controlled substance is defined in 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(6) (West 1981). Forfeiture of real
and personal property under Section 881 is "not dependent on the quantity of the controlled
narcotic substance found." United States v. One 1977 Chevrolet Pickup, 503 F. Supp. 1027,
1030 (D. Colo. 1980). But see United States v. Land, Property Currently Recorded in the Name
of Neff, 960 F.2d 561, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that possession of half gram of cocaine
in house did not support forfeiture action); United States v. One Gates Learjet, 861 F.2d 868 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that trace amount of cocaine, invisible to the naked eye, was insufficient to
support forfeiture under Section 881).
101. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1607(a) (West Supp. 1995) provides as follows:
If-
(1) the value of such seized vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage
does not exceed $500,000;
(2) such seized merchandise is merchandise the importation of which is
prohibited;
(3) such seized vessel, vehicle, or aircraft was used to import, export, transport,
or store any controlled substance; or
(4) such seized merchandise is any monetary instrument within the meaning
of section 5312(a)(3) of Title 31;
the appropriate customs officer shall cause a notice of the seizure of such articles
and the intention to forfeit and sell or otherwise dispose of the same according to law
to be published for at least three successive weeks in such manner as the Secretary of
the Treasury may direct. Written notice of seizure together with information on the
applicable procedures shall be sent to each party who appears to have an interest in the
seized article.
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appears to have an interest in the seized property."°2 If no claim is
filed or bond given within twenty days from the date of first publica-
tion of the seizure, the property is forfeited. 103 If any person claim-
ing an interest in the property files a claim and bond within the
requisite time period, the United States Attorney for the district in
which seizure was made shall proceed to condemn the property.' °
The bond filed must be in the amount of $5,000 or 10% of the value
of the property, whichever is lower, but in no event less than $250.
The claimant must also agree to pay the costs and expenses of the
condemn ation proceeding in the event the property is finally forfeit-
ed. 105
As an alternative to proceedings in federal court, the claimant
(owner) may file a petition for remission or mitigation with the
Secretary of the Treasury. 116 This procedure is frequently chosen by
102. Id.
103. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1609(a) (West Supp. 1995) provides as follows:
If no such claim is filed or bond given within the twenty days hereinbefore specified,
the appropriate customs officer shall declare the vessel [sic] vehicle, aircraft, merchan-
dise, or baggage forfeited, and shall sell the same at public auction in the same manner
as merchandise abandoned to the United States is sold or otherwise dispose of the same
according to law, and shall deposit the proceeds of sale, after deducting the expenses
described in section 1613 of this title, into the Customs Forfeiture Fund.
104. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1608 (West Supp. 1995) provides as follows:
Any person claiming such vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage may at any
time within twenty days from the date of the first publication of the notice of seizure
file with the appropriate customs officer a claim stating his interest therein. Upon the
filing of such claim, and the giving of a bond to the United States in the penal sum of
$5,000 or 10 percent of the value of the claimed property, whichever is lower, but not
less than $250, with sureties to be approved by such customs officer, conditioned that
in case of condemnation of the articles so claimed the obligor shall pay all the costs and
expenses of the proceedings to obtain such condemnation, such customs officer shall
transmit such claim and bond, with a duplicate list and description of the articles seized,
to the United States attorney for the district in which seizure was made, who shall
proceed to a condemnation of the merchandise or other property in the manner
prescribed by law.
105. Id.
106. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1618 (West Supp. 1995) provides as follows:
Whenever any person interested in any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage
seized under the provisions of this chapter, or who has incurred, or is alleged to have
incurred, any fine or penalty thereunder, files with the Secretary of the Treasury if
under the customs laws, and with the Commandant of the Coast Guard or the
Commissioner of Customs, as the case may be, if under the navigation laws, before the
sale of such vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage a petition for the remission
or mitigation of such fine,, penalty, or forfeiture, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, or the Commissioner of Customs, if he finds that
such fine, penalty, or forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any
intention on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or
finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or
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the clearly innocent owner. This petition does not contest the probable
cause for the forfeiture, but asserts the innocence of the lien creditor.
Decisions by the Secretary with regard to these petitions are final and
are not judicially reviewable." 7
In a forfeiture proceeding, the property, not the owner, is
considered the offender,0 8 just as in the case of a pirate ship.'0 9
The government's right to the property relates back to the time of the
offense." 0 Thus, the plain language of Section 881 severs the rights
of secured parties or purchasers who have advanced credit or purchased
"guilty" property.1"
1. Probable Cause
Property owners are placed in grave difficulty by substantive and
procedural aspects of forfeiture doctrine. In order to forfeit property,
the government is only required to show probable cause to seize the
property."' In most courts, this means that the government must
only demonstrate reasonable grounds for the belief that the property is
subject to forfeiture, supported by less than prima facie proof, but
more than mere suspicion.113
Applying this standard in United States v. One 56-Foot Motor
Yacht Named The Tahuna,114 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
defined the required level of probable cause as "whether the informa-
tion relied on by the government is adequate and sufficiently reliable
mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, may remit or mitigate the same upon such
terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just, or order discontinuance of any
prosecution relating thereto. In order to enable him to ascertain the facts, the Secretary
of the Treasury may issue a commission to any customs officer to take testimony upon
such petition: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to deprive any
person of an award of compensation made before the filing of such petition.
For criteria and procedure under 19 U.S.C.A. § 1618, see 28 C.F.R. § 9 (1994).
107. See United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 732-33 (6th Cir. 1964).
108. See United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1980).
109. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 7 (1827); United States v. The Cargo
of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 209 (1844).
110. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(h) (West Supp. 1995). Section 881(h) declares that all right,
tide, and interest in such property vests in the United States upon commission of an act giving
rise to forfeiture under Section 881.
111. See id.
112. United States v. 6250 Ledge Road, 943 F.2d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1991).
113. United States v. $38,600.00 in U.S. Currency, 784 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1986); see,
e.g., United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 55 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1294 (1994);
United States v. 785 St. Nicholas Ave., 983 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2349
(1993); United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Padilla,
888 F.2d 642, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dickerson, 873 F.2d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.
1988).
114. 702 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983).
Seattle University Law Review
to warrant the belief by a reasonable person" that the property was
utilized for an illegal purpose.'13 Similarly, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts upheld vessel forfeiture when
probable cause was based on the government's (subjective) belief that
the vessel was intended for an illegal purpose. 116 In a money forfei-
ture case, the First Circuit held that "[t]he government need only show
that it has probable cause to believe that the money is drug-related.
This showing can be made wholly with otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence. '"' 17
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida characterized the government's burden as "comparatively easy,
even for a civil case.""' 8 According to this court, evidence that a
boat was found in the vicinity where a drug transaction recently oc-
curred and was modified for increased speed and carrying capacity
provided sufficient probable cause to initiate forfeiture proceedings. 9
Once the government meets its burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the person claiming the property. The property owner must show
that the government did not have probable cause' or must demon-
strate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the owner was an
innocent. 2' The burden of proof shifts to the property owner
because of the legal fiction that civil forfeitures are forfeitures in rem,
or against the thing, and not against the person who owns the
thing.'22 Because the action is against the thing,'23 the usual gamut
of constitutional protections for persons accused of a crime does not
apply. In fact, the guilt or innocence of the property owner is
generally irrelevant.' However, the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that rejecting the constitutional claim of a property owner who
proved that he or she was not only uninvolved in the unlawful activity
115. Id. at 1282.
116. United States v. One 55 Foot Fishing Vessel, 656 F. Supp. 967, 968-69 (D. Mass.
1987).
117. United States v. $250,000.00 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 899 (1st Cir.
1987); see also United States v. $5,644,540.00 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1362
(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. One 1974 Porsche 911S, 682 F.2d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 1982).
118. United States v. One 1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer, 624 F. Supp. 290, 295 (S.D.
Fla. 1985).
119. Id. at 292, 296.
120. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1615 (West Supp. 1995).
121. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(7) (West Supp. 1995).
122. See discussion supra part II.A.
123. See discussion supra part II.B.
124. "Despite [the] proliferation of forfeiture enactments, the innocence of the owner of
property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense." Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
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but also took all reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use of the
property would be difficult.125
2. Innocent Owner Defense
In addition to providing the government a relatively easy burden
of probable cause, current forfeiture doctrine may allow innocent
owners to lose their property notwithstanding their innocence. Sections
881(a)(4)(C) and (a)(7) provide that no conveyance or interest in real
property shall be forfeited by reason of any act or omission established
by the owner to have been committed or omitted without his or her
knowledge or consent.126  Although this provision appears to com-
pletely protect innocent owners, the government need only show
probable cause to forfeit the property and the burden is on the owner
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, lack of knowledge or
consent. 27
The Supreme Court has also provided a constitutionally grounded
innocent owner defense, though only in dictum. In Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 12 the Court stated that if a property
owner proved that he or she (1) was uninvolved and unaware of the
wrongful activity and (2) took all reasonable precautions to prevent the
proscribed use of the property, then it would be difficult for a court to
reject the owner's argument that the forfeiture of the property was
unconstitutional.129
The lower courts have given meaning to the Supreme Court's
dictum in Calero-Toledo. For example, a forfeiture action was
unsuccessful when a daughter used a family car without authorization
in an illegal manner when, at the time that she did so, her father was
trying to find her to repossess the car. 30 Similarly, a forfeiture
action failed when a father gave his son permission to use a vehicle on
one occasion, and the son used the car illegally on a different,
unauthorized occasion.' However, if general consent to use the
vehicle is given and if a borrowed vehicle is used illegally by a person
with a past criminal record, forfeiture will be allowed.'32
125. Id. at 689-90. The innocent owner defense is not a defense that is asserted successfully
with any great frequency.
126. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(4)(c). (a)(7) (West Supp. 1995).
127. United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1995).
128. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
129. Id. at 689.
130. United States v. One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 644 F. Supp. 1280, 1286-88 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
131. United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp. 613, 620-21 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
132. United States v. One 1980 BMW 3201, 559 F. Supp. 382, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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3. Facilitation
Another statutory interpretation that allows for broad application
of forfeiture laws is facilitation. Forfeiture actions may succeed even
when the property bears only slight connection to the alleged illegal
conduct. With three limited exceptions, 133 Section 881(a)(4) subjects
to forfeiture all conveyances that are used, or intended to be used, "in
any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or
concealment" of controlled substances."3 4 Section 881(a)(7) subjects
to forfeiture all real property that is "in any manner or part" used or
intended to be used "to facilitate . . . a violation of this subchapter
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.' 135 The similar
language of the conveyance and real property forfeiture provisions has
resulted in courts interpreting the provisions similarly.'36
Under both provisions, courts have differed in construing what
constitutes facilitation. Some courts allow property forfeiture no matter
how tenuous the property's connection to the activity justifying the
forfeiture. 3 7  For example, in United States v. 38 Whalers Cove
Drive,'38 a confidential drug informant requested that a drug sale
occur inside a condominium. Because the condominium permitted the
drug seller to conduct the drug sale "in an atmosphere of relative
privacy," the court found that a sufficient connection existed between
the property and the drug activity to bring the property into the
purview of the [forfeiture] statute.
3 9
133. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1995).
134. Id. § 881(a)(4).
135. Id. § 881(a)(7). For a discussion of the scope of the word "facilitate," see Sean D.
Smith, Comment, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes Under the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 303, 325-29 (1988).
136. James B. Speta, Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881,
Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REv. 165, 167 n.16 (1990).
137. See, e.g., United States v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d 651, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1993);
United States v. 785 St. Nicholas Ave., 983 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. 38
Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992); United States
v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling Located on Whites Hill Rd., 916 F.2d 808, 811-12 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991); United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492-
94 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991); United States v. 4492 South Livonia Rd.,
889 F.2d 1258, 1269 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154,
1160-61 (2d Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. All Funds Presently on
Deposit or Attempted to be Deposited in any Accounts Maintained at American Express Bank,
832 F. Supp. 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d
725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that property used in any manner to facilitate unlawful narcotics
activity can be forfeited), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
138. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
139. Id. at 33.
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Similarly, in United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7,140
a car was used to locate a suitable landing spot for an airplane full of
marijuana, to arrange for the rental of a U-Haul truck to transport the
marijuana, and to lease a motor home and a metal building in which
to stash the contraband after its arrival.' 4 ' The car was forfeited
because, although the car was never used to transport marijuana, "its
use in laying the groundwork for the marijuana operation establishe[d]
beyond peradventure the nexus required by the statute" between the
property and the commission of crimes involving illegal drugs.'42
Furthermore, when a drug transaction was arranged over the
phone,'43 a house was forfeited on the ground that it facilitated the
sale of the narcotics. 4 4  The court noted that the government need
show only a nexus between the property and the crime that is more
than "incidental or fortuitous. '
In contrast to this tenuous connection, other courts require a
"substantial connection" between the property forfeited and the
criminal conduct.'46 For example, in United States v. 1966 Beechcraft
Aircraft Model King Air A-90,147 the court relied on legislative history
to conclude that a substantial nexus between the property and the
underlying criminal activity must be shown before property may be
forfeited.'48 However, the court held that the use of an airplane to
transport conspirators to an exchange site established a substantial
connection sufficient to justify forfeiting the property. 4
9
140. 666 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1982).
141. Id. at 229.
142. Id. at 230.
143. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d at 491.
144. Id. at 494.
145. See id.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, 998 F.2d 204, 210-11 (4th Cir.
1993); United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. One Parcel
of Real Property, 900 F.2d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538,
1542 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F.2d
947, 953 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring substantial connection between property and conduct
justifying forfeiture); United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F.2d 525, 527 (8th
Cir. 1985).
147. 777 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985).
148. Id. at 953.
149. Id. In an anomalous case, a court held that no sufficient nexus existed between a car
and an illegal drug transaction when the car was used to transport the drug seller to a prearranged
meeting spot where the transaction money changed hands. United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet
Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (1st Cir. 1980). The court reasoned that although the statute
set out a per se rule that conveyances used to transport contraband were subject to forfeiture,
conveyances used to transport proceeds of contraband were not, per se, subject to forfeiture. Id.
at 1028. In cases dealing with proceeds, the court required that an antecedent relationship exist
between the car and the illegal activity; when no antecedent relationship exists, forfeiture is not
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The plain language of the statute suggests that courts err when
they insist on a substantial connection between property and illegal
behavior. However, some courts have created the substantial connec-
tion requirement in an attempt to distinguish among parties based on
culpability, a result encouraged by some commentators. 50 In any
case, even the substantial connection test does not impose much of a
burden on the government.
4. Delay
The allowable time period for bringing a forfeiture action also
does not impose much of burden on the government. No requirement
of promptitude limits the government's power.
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1993 term, whether government
delay in initiating a forfeiture proceeding could preclude forfeiture
remained questionable.' 5' Under the customs laws relating to the
seizure and forfeiture of property, which are incorporated in Section
881,152 forfeiture actions must be commenced within five years.
5 3
However, under the customs laws, various internal timing requirements
mandate that proceedings be initiated promptly.'5 4  In United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Property,5' the Supreme Court directly
addressed whether failure to comply with the internal timing require-
ments of the customs laws could justify dismissal of a forfeiture
action. 156  The answer was negative. As long as the forfeiture
proceeding was initiated within the five year statute of limitations, the
government's action was timely.5
7
allowed. See id. at 1029-30. The court's holding is curious because the statute does not, in fact,
lay down a rule that only conveyances used to transport contraband are per se subject to forfeiture.
The statute very plainly states that "[a]ll conveyances ... which are used ... in any manner to
facilitate the . . . sale" of illegal drugs are subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4) (West
Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). Clearly, the statute does not restrict forfeiture to property that
has an "antecedent relationship" with the criminal activity. The words "antecedent relationship"
(or any others having the same or similar meaning) are not found in the statute.
150. See, e.g., Speta, supra note 136, at 181.
151. See, Youngman, supra note 69, at 1014; see generally Kenneth Kandaras, Federal
Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need to Guarantee a Prompt Trial, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 195
(1981); Kenneth Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need for
Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 SW. L.J. 925 (1980).
152. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(d) (West Supp. 1995).
153. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (West Supp. 1995).
154. See, e.g., id. §§ 1602-1604.
155. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
156. Id. at 505-07.
157. Id. at 507.
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5. Disposition of Forfeited Property
As a result of these broad interpretations of the statute and the
government's incentives to forfeit property, forfeiture laws foster abuse
and corruption. When property is forfeited to the federal government
under Section 881, the property may be (1) retained "for official use";
(2) transferred to any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency
that participated directly in the seizure; (3) sold at public sale or by
any other commercially feasible means; (4) forwarded to the General
Services Administration for lawful disposal; (5) forwarded to the Drug
Enforcement Administration for disposition; or (6) transferred to any
foreign country that participated directly or indirectly in the seizure of
the property." 8
Section 881 also includes a provision for expense and cost
recovery: When property is sold or money is forfeited, the proceeds
may be used to reimburse the federal government for all of its seizure
and forfeiture expenses."3 9 Also covered are expenses associated with
the maintenance of custody and advertising, as well as court costs. 60
After covering these expenses and costs, the remaining proceeds are
forwarded to the Treasurer of the United States. 161
This expense and cost recovery provision, Section 881(e), is one
of the most important provisions of Section 881 because without it, it
is safe to assume that the statute would be used less frequently and
would be less amenable to abuse.
Section 881(e) explains the Donald Scott incident. 162 The value
of Donald Scott's property probably attracted the attention of the many
law enforcement agencies, all seeking reimbursement for their expenses.
Section 881 gives the Attorney General great latitude to determine
reimbursement amounts for state and local law enforcement agen-
cies. 163  In his analysis of the Donald Scott death, the Ventura
County District Attorney speculated that the LASD did not inform the
Ventura County Sheriff s Department, which had primary jurisdiction
over the Scott ranch, of the service of the warrant "because Los
Angeles County did not want to split the forfeiture proceeds with
[Ventura County]."'"6
158. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(e)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
159. See id. § 881(e)(2)(A)(i).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 881(e)(2)(B).
162. See supra pp. 3-5.
163. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(e)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
164. Bradbury, supra note 7, at 51.
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Another concern raised by the disposition of forfeited property
provisions of Section 881 is that property forfeited may be retained
"for official use."' 65 What constitutes "official use" is not explained
in the statute and remains open to question. For example, instances
have been reported of federal law enforcement agencies retaining
expensive sports cars. In Drug Awareness Resistance Education
(DARE) programs around the country, one particularly favored
method of impressing upon today's youth that crime does not pay is
to drive up in an expensive sports car proudly displayed as formerly
the property of a drug dealer.
The statutory provisions governing the sale of forfeited property
also cause concern. The statute simply states that property forfeited
may be sold "by public sale or any other commercially feasible
means." 166  The statute does not impose any requirement that
property be sold to bring the highest price in a given market.
Consequently, property may be sold for far less than fair market value,
a possibility that raises the prospect of corruption. Certainly such
impulses should be held at bay as much as possible through strict
procedural requirements governing the sale of forfeited property.
6. Constitutional Rights in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings
Only a few of the constitutional guarantees attendant to criminal
prosecutions are available in a civil forfeiture proceeding. For example,
the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures applies in forfeiture proceedings, 167 as do certain exclusionary
rules. 6' Additionally, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination applies in forfeiture cases in which the culpability of the
owner is relevant or in which the owner faces the prospect of subse-
quent criminal prosecution. 169
However, significant constitutional protections attendant to
criminal prosecutions do not apply in civil forfeiture proceedings; thus,
the label "civil" still accurately describes the process. For example, the
Due Process Clause's requirement that guilt in a criminal proceeding
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply in civil forfeiture
165. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
166. Id. § 881(e)(1)(B).
167. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696-700 (1965); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
168. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 696.
169. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 717-18 (1971);
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
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proceedings, 70 nor does the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause,' 7 ' nor the Ex Post Facto Clause.1
7 2
The Double Jeopardy Clause applies in the civil forfeiture context,
but how the clause applies is open to question. In United States v.
Halper,73 the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
applies if the forfeiture is considered punishment. 74 Since Halper,
the Court has considered whether forfeiture constitutes punishment
and has concluded that it does. 175  In Department of Revenue of
Montana v. Kurth Ranch,'76 the Supreme Court wrote that "[a]
defendant convicted and punished for an offense may not have a non-
remedial civil penalty imposed against him for the same offense in a
separate proceeding."'1 77  Because civil forfeiture proceedings result
in nonremedial civil penalties imposed in a separate proceeding,78
usually following a criminal conviction, the language of Kurth Ranch
might bar most civil forfeiture actions. Thus, the government would
be forced to bring criminal forfeiture proceedings in the same
proceeding as the criminal action. 17
9
While this may, at first blush, seem to be a significant impedi-
ment to law enforcement agencies that initiate civil forfeiture proceed-
ings, in fact it is not. Instead of prosecuting criminally, the govern-
mental agency may seek to punish in a civil forfeiture proceeding.
Similarly, the state can institute the criminal prosecution, and the
federal government can institute the civil forfeiture proceedings,
utilizing the double sovereignty avoidance of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Additionally, Mr. Justice Scalia's dissent in Kurth Ranch hints that
the case's holding might not be as all-encompassing as it first appears.
Justice Scalia asks whether the order of punishment is significant in
determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the second
170. See Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 271-72 (1877); United States
v. $250,000 in United States Currency. 808 F.2d 895, 897 (1st Cir. 1987).
171. See United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896).
172. See United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988).
173. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
174. See id. at 448-49.
175. See infra part III.A.
176. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
177. Id. at 1945.
178. See infra part III.A.
179. Even in criminal forfeiture proceedings, the government does not have to prove that
forfeiture is warranted under the law beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the preponderance of the
evidence burden prevails. United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 208 (1994).
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punishment, hinting that if civil forfeiture occurs first, the Double
Jeopardy Clause will not bar the subsequent criminal prosecution. 80
Thus, the holding of Kurth Ranch might not be symmetrical; the
holding might bar double punishments when civil proceedings are
instituted after a criminal prosecution, but not when civil proceedings
precede the criminal prosecution."'
Though Kurth Ranch will probably result in a significant
curtailment of government abuse under the civil forfeiture statute,
Kurth Ranch will not prevent all abuse. A substantive limitation on
the government's forfeiture powers is needed. The Excessive Fines
Clause might provide that protection. The Supreme Court revived the
Excessive Fines Clause in its 1993 term, and this clause holds the
promise of containing government abuses more completely than does
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE 1992-93 SUPREME
COURT TERM
The Supreme Court decided Austin v. United States8 2 during its
1992-93 term. Because Austin imposes a substantive limitation on the
government's power to forfeit property, this decision may come to be
considered the most important of the four civil forfeiture opinions the
Court issued during its 1992-93 term.'83
A. Austin v. United States
1. Facts
In Austin, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause'84 applies in civil forfeiture
cases. 8 5 The petitioner, Richard Austin, was convicted of possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute.'86 Shortly after Austin pleaded
180. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1959-60.
181. Mr. Justice Scalia's dissent argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar
successive punishments, only successive prosecutions. Id. at 1959. The Court could later accept
Justice Scalia's decision, thus rendering the Double Jeopardy Clause useless as a bar to a civil
forfeiture proceeding.
182. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
183. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property 114 S: Ct. 492 (1993); Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126
(1993); Republic Nat'l Bank of Miarni v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992).
184. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
185. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
186. Id.
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guilty to the charge, the United States filed an in rem action in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, seeking
to forfeit Austin's home and auto body shop under Sections 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7). 87
According to a local police officer's affidavit, Austin agreed to sell
cocaine while at his body shop.' Austin then left his shop and
went to his home, and he returned with the cocaine he had agreed to
sell."89 State authorities subsequently searched Austin's shop and
home and discovered small amounts of marijuana and cocaine, drug
paraphernalia, and $4,700 in cash.' 90 In opposition to the govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment, Austin argued that the
forfeiture of his home and shop would violate the Excessive Fines
Clause.'
Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected Austin's argument.192 The Supreme Court accepted certiora-
ri to resolve a conflict among the circuits over the applicability of the
Eighth Amendment in civil in rem actions.'
93
2. The Conflict Among the Circuits
Prior to Austin, the First, 194  Third,'95  Fourth, 196  Se-




190. Id. at 2802-03.
191. Id. at 2803.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2804.
194. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Property with Buildings, Appurtenances,
and Improvements, 960 F.2d 200, 206 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884
F.2d 41, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding the Eighth Amendment's disproportionality protections
inapplicable in the civil context).
195. See, e.g., United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400-01 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding that civil forfeiture does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment's disproportionality protections apply only in the criminal context).
197. See, e.g., United States v. 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d 721, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply in civil actions), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809
(1991).
198. See, e.g., United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment's proportionality analysis does not apply in civil actions), rev'd sub
nom. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
199. See, e.g., United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment's disproportionality restrictions do not apply in the civil context),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989). Although the Ninth Circuit was steadfast in its conclusion that
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cided that the Eighth Amendment did not apply in civil forfeiture
proceedings. The Sixth Circuit hinted that the Eighth Amendment did
not apply in such proceedings but never directly addressed the issue
because no cases were presented in which a forfeiture constituted
excessive punishment, even if the Eighth Amendment applied.2"'
When the Second Circuit was confronted with the issue in United
States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive,2"2 the court held that the Eighth
Amendment did apply when an individual was subjected to a civil
penalty properly classifiable as punitive under the test set forth in
United States v. Halper20 3 Thus, a split in the circuits was created.
The split between the circuits was precipitated by two 1989
Supreme Court decisions, Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc.
v. Kelco Disposal2°  and United States v. Halper.2°5  In Kelco Dis-
posal, the Court opened the door for the Excessive Fines Clause to be
applied in the civil forfeiture context. The Court found that the
Excessive Fines Clause was designed to limit "the ability of the
sovereign to use its prosecutorial power, including the power to collect
fines, for improper ends. '2 6  In Halper, the Court opened the door
even further to the possibility that the Excessive Fines Clause might
apply in the civil forfeiture context. The Court found that a civil
penalty might constitute punishment for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment. 27  The Court rejected a formalistic solution to the
the Eighth Amendment did not apply in civil forfeiture proceedings, the Ninth Circuit concluded
without trouble that the Eighth Amendment did apply in criminal forfeiture cases. See United
States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409,
1415-16 (9th Cir. 1987). To the Ninth Circuit, criminal forfeiture was clearly punishment, and
the courts had "the constitutional responsibility" to assure that the forfeiture did not inflict
excessive punishment. Littlefield, 821 F.2d at 1368. In civil forfeiture cases, however, the court
had no such responsibility; in fact, -it had "no discretion" at all. See id.
200. See, e.g., United States v. 3097 S.W. 111th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis does not apply in civil forfeiture
proceedings).
201. See United States v. 566 Hendrickson Boulevard, 986 F.2d 990, 999 (6th Cir. 1993);
United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 881 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109
(1991).
202. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
203. Id. at 35; United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
204. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
205. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
206. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. at 267.
207. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. In Halper, the defendant was convicted of defrauding the
government of $585 and sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined $5,000. Id. at 437. The
government then sought to impose on him a penalty of $130,000 under the False Claims Act.
Id. at 438. The defendant argued that the penalty was punishment, and thus, that he was being
subjected to double jeopardy. See id. The Court held that a defendant is entitled to have the
government account for its losses when a civil penalty is sought to be imposed after the imposition
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problem of what might constitute punishment. The labels "civil" and
"criminal" were rejected as being "not of paramount importance.P208
Instead, the Court wrote the following:
[T]he determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes
punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment
of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly
be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction
constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment." 9
The twin aims of punishment the Court identified were retribu-
tion and deterrence. 210 Quoting an earlier Supreme Court case, the
Court wrote that "[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate
nonpunitive governmental objectives. "211 Having cast the definition
of punishment in rather broad terms, the Court concluded that any
civil sanction that serves not only remedial purposes, but also serves
the goals of retribution or deterrence, is punishment. 2
Thus, Kelco and Halper precipitated the split in the circuits. The
First Circuit, in United States v. One Parcel of Real Property with
Buildings, Appurtenances and Improvements,"3 decided that the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality analysis did not apply in the civil
forfeiture context without fully addressing the arguments based on
Kelco and Halper.214 The court cited Kelco and Halper and discussed
the Second Circuit's opinion in 38 Whalers Cove Drive.2 15  However,
the court, having ruled the other way in a previous case, felt bound by
its precedent.2"6 The prior decision relied on was United States v. 40
Moon Hill Road.217 However, in 40 Moon Hill Road, the court did
not address whether the Eighth Amendment applied in civil forfeiture
proceedings because the appellants in that case failed to make the
argument in their brief; thus, appellants had waived the point.218
of criminal penalties, the penalty bears no relationship to the compensation of the government for
its loss, and the penalty appears to qualify as punishment in the ordinary sense of the term. Id.
at 449-50.
208. Id. at 447.
209. Id. at 448.
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
212. Id.
213. 960 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1992).
214. See id. at 206-07.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 207.
217. 884 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1989).
218. Id. at 44.
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Despite this, the court relied on this decision as precedential authority
for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment did not apply in civil
forfeiture proceedings.
In contrast, the Third Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment
did not apply in civil forfeiture proceedings because the "effect of the
statute does not belie a civil sanction. Rather, it is a permissible civil
response by Congress to complement criminal law enforcement
directed at a most corrosive force in our society." '219 The Third
Circuit cited the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Santoro22° to bolster its analysis.221 The decision in Santoro cited
neither Kelco nor Halper22
The Seventh Circuit addressed, though only summarily, the issues
raised by Kelco and Halper 23  In United States v. 6250 Ledge
Road,224 the Seventh Circuit recognized that at least one commentator
suggested that Kelco and Halper could be read as suggesting that the
Eighth Amendment applies in the civil forfeiture context . 2 5 Howev-
er, the court did not address the merits of the defendant's argument
because the argument did "not extend beyond the contention that the
government failed to show that his- entire property was connected to
drug activity. '226  The court held that the defendant must explain
why forfeiture of all his property ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment,
not just claim that it did.227 When the court addressed the issue in
United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Building,121 it
relied on Ninth Circuit authority summarily to reject the argument that
the Eighth Amendment applied to civil forfeiture proceedings.
229
In United States v. 508 Depot Street,230 the Eighth Circuit relied
on the in rem nature of a civil forfeiture proceeding to hold that the
219. United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1990).
220. 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
221. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d at 401.
222. See Santoro, 866 F.2d at 1544.
223. See, e.g., United States v. 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d 721, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1991)
(dismissing argument based on litigant's failure to explain why forfeiture was disproportionate);
United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1990)
(relying on Ninth Circuit authority to summarily dismiss argument that Eighth Amendment
applies in civil forfeiture proceeding), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809 (1991).
224. 943 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1991).
225. Id. at 727-28 (citing D. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE
ACTIONS § 13.05 (1991)).
226. Id. at 728,
227. Id.
228. 918 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809 (1991).
229. Id. at 1296.
230. 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub norm. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801
(1993).
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Eighth Amendment did not apply. 3' Like the Seventh Circuit, this
court also relied upon the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in United States
v. 300 Cove Road to find that the Eighth Amendment did not
apply.232 In 300 Cove Road, the Ninth Circuit held that "[i]f the
constitution allows in rem forfeiture to be visited upon innocent owners
... the constitution hardly requires proportionality review of forfei-
tures .. "233 This reasoning is flawed because the Constitution
probably does not allow forfeiture to be visited upon truly innocent
owners, as the Supreme Court has hinted but has not yet directly
asserted. 34 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit also cited 300 Cove
Road as authority for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment did
not apply in civil forfeiture proceedings; the Eleventh Circuit cited
neither Kelco nor Halper.235
The Second Circuit is the only circuit that relied on Kelco and
Halper to hold that the Eighth Amendment applied in civil forfeiture
proceedings. 36 In 38 Whalers Cove Drive, the government seized a
condominium belonging to Edwin Levin, who pled guilty to selling
about $250 worth of cocaine from his condominium. 237  Levin's
condominium was valued at $145,000, of which about $68,000 was
Levin's equity.23 The court analogized Levin's situation to that of
the defendant in Halper.239 It had little trouble deciding that the
Eighth Amendment applied in civil forfeiture proceedings. The court
stated:
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly so rule in Halper, in
[Kelco], decided shortly after Halper, the Court stated that Halper
"implies that punitive damages awarded to the Government in a
civil action may raise Eighth Amendment concerns .... "
We read Halper to apply to civil forfeitures. Forfeitures that
are overwhelmingly disproportionate to the value of the offense must
231. Id. at 817-18.
232. Id. at 817 (citing United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)).
233. 861 F.2d at 234.
234. As the Court stated in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., "it would be
difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive"
if an owner proved that he or she was uninvolved and knew nothing of the wrongful activity and
could not reasonably have prevented the wrongful use of his or her property. 416 U.S. 663, 689-
90 (1974).
235. See United States v. 3097 SW. 111th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991).
236. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
237. Id. at 32.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 34.
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
be classified as punishment unless the forfeitures are shown to serve
articulated, legitimate civil purposes.
240
Thus, the court found that removing instrumentalities of crime is a
legitimate civil purpose of an in rem forfeiture. 41 Other legitimate
purposes of civil forfeiture include compensating the government for
its investigation and enforcement expenditures.242
The court went on to demonstrate how the Halper rule applied in
the civil forfeiture context. In applying the Halper test, the court
stated that the particular forfeiture at hand must be examined to
determine whether the forfeiture is punitive in nature or whether the
forfeiture is fully justified by legitimate civil and remedial purpos-
es.243  In making this determination, the focus of the inquiry is on
the individual who has violated the law.2" Thus, the court stated:
[A] forfeiture .. .will not be presumed punitive where the seized
property has been used substantially to accomplish illegal purposes,
so that the property itself can be said to be "culpable" or an
instrumentality of crime. Where the seized property is not itself an
instrumentality of crime, however, and its total value is overwhelm-
ingly disproportionate to the value of controlled substances involved
in the statutory violation, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
forfeiture is punitive in nature.24
Once the presumption that a forfeiture is punitive arises, the burden
shifts to the government to account for its losses. 246 The government
may show the costs of investigation and detection, as well as damages
attributable to the defendant.247 A reasonable allocation for general-
ized enforcement costs can also be made. 24' However, the determina-
tion of costs and damages must be individualized.249  "[Fiull
responsibility for the 'war on drugs' [cannot be placed] on the
shoulders of every individual [wrongdoer].
250
240. Id. at 35 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257,
275 n.2 1 (1989)).
241. Id. However, items that themselves cannot be considered contraband cannot be
considered instrumentalities of crime. See id. at 37.
242. Id. at 36.
243. See id. at 36-37.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citation omitted).
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In the case of Edward Levin, the appellant in 38 Whalers Cover
Drive, the court first considered whether the forfeited condominium
constituted an instrumentality of crime."' Because the government
did not argue that the condominium was an instrumentality of crime,
the court addressed the next issue: whether the forfeiture served the
civil goal of compensation." 2 To determine whether the forfeiture
fulfilled that purpose, the court had to determine whether the forfeiture
was disproportionately large relative to the value of the drugs involved
in the crime.2 3' Because the value of Levin's interest in the condo-
minium was almost three hundred times the value of the cocaine
involved in the crime, the court held, as a matter of law, that the
forfeiture was overwhelmingly disproportionate and thus presumptively
punitive.
2 54
Ordinarily, at this point in the proceedings, the government would
have the opportunity to show its costs in an attempt to defeat the
presumption that the forfeiture was punitive. 5 However, instead of
remanding the case for findings of fact on this issue, the court held as
a matter of law that the forfeiture of Levin's interest in the condomini-
um did not violate the Eighth Amendment.2 6
The Second Circuit considered that the Eighth Amendment does
not proscribe mere punishment; it proscribes only severe punish-
ment.25 7 The court said that three factors are relevant in determining
whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime
committed: "(1) the inherent gravity of the offense; (2) the sentences
imposed for similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction; and (3)
the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. -258
The court held that drug trafficking is an inherently grave offense. 9
Because fines in the same range as the value of Levin's equity in his
condominium were countenanced under both federal and state law for
251. Id. Whether a piece of property is considered an instrument of crime usually depends
on whether possession of the property alone constitutes an offense. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965) (rebuffing a state's attempt to characterize a
vehicle used to transport liquor as contraband, stating "[tihere is nothing even remotely criminal
in possessing an automobile").




256. Id. at 37-39.
257. Id. at 38.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 38-39.
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similar offenses,26° the forfeiture did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.26
1
3. The Majority Opinion of the Supreme Court
In Austin, the Court directly addressed the issue of whether the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies in civil forfeiture
proceedings under Section 881 and held that it does.262 In the
Court's view, the Excessive Fines Clause applies in all civil proceed-
ings in which the government stands to gain financially;263 whether
those proceedings are criminal in nature is not outcome determina-
tive.264  The Court rejected the government's argument that the
Eighth Amendment does not apply in civil proceedings unless the
forfeitures are so punitive as to be considered criminal punishment.26 5
Civil proceedings can effect punishment, just as criminal proceedings
can.266 Thus, the question is not "whether forfeiture under [Section
881] is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.
267
The Court relied on the Halper test to determine whether the
forfeiture sought in Austin constituted punishment.268 First, the
Court recognized that civil sanctions that do not serve purely remedial
purposes, but can also serve the purposes of retribution or deterrence,
constitute punishment under Halper.269 The Court then analyzed
whether forfeiture could be understood to constitute punishment when
the Eighth Amendment was enacted, and whether forfeiture can be
understood to constitute punishment today, under the Halper test.270
The Court relied on two factors in concluding that, at the time the
Eighth Amendment was adopted, forfeiture was understood, at least in
part, to constitute punishment.27' First, the Court recognized that
the forfeiture of property involved in wrongdoing has been traditionally
understood as a method of punishing the owner of the property, either
260. Id. at 39.
261. Id.
262. 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993).
263. Id. at 2804. The Court noted "that the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit
only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government." Id. (quoting Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989)).
264. Id. at 2804-05.
265. Id. at 2805.





271. See id. at 2806-10.
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for negligently using the property or for negligently suffering the
property to be misused.272 Second, the Court relied on its reservation
over the forfeiture of property of a truly innocent owner:273 "If
forfeiture had been understood not to punish the owner, there would
have been no reason to reserve the case of a truly innocent owner.
Indeed, it is only on the assumption that forfeiture serves in part to
punish that the Court's past reservation of that question makes
sense."274
In addition to being an acceptable interpretation of the Framers'
intent, the Court also held that forfeiture is properly considered
punishment today.273 Important to the Court in this determination
were the exemptions in the statute for innocent owners and 19 U.S.C.
§ 1618, which empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to return
property to people who did not intend to break the law.276  These
provisions demonstrated to the Court that Congress intended to impose
a penalty only on willful lawbreakers. 277  Also important in this
regard was the tying of forfeiture to the commission of criminal
acts.278 Additionally, the Court relied on the legislative history of the
real property forfeiture provision of Section 881, which indicates that
Congress viewed forfeiture as punishment. 27 9  Finally, the Court
relied on the Halper test, and concluded that forfeiture can be
understood as punishment today because forfeiture does not serve
solely remedial purposes, but also serves the policies of retribution and
deterrence.280
Having determined that forfeiture constitutes punishment for
Eighth Amendment purposes, the Court remanded the case to the
circuit court to determine whether the punishment was excessive for
purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause.281
272. Id. at 2808. In a footnote, the Court wrote that excessive reliance on the "technical
distinction between proceedings in ren and proceedings in psonam... would be misplaced" and
that the in rem fiction was created primarily to broaden the jurisdiction of the courts. Id. at 2808-
09 n.9.
273. Id. at 2808 (citing, among other cases, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974)).
274. Id. at 2809.
275. Id. at 2810.
276. Id. at 2810-11 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (a)(7) (year of code not provided); 19
U.S.C. § 1618 (year of code not provided)).
277. Id. at 2811.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2812.
281. Id.
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4. Mr. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Mr. Justice Scalia wrote separately to express his opinion that the
majority went too far and needlessly attempted "to derive from our
sparse case law on the subject of in rem forfeiture the questionable
proposition that the owner of property taken pursuant to such
forfeiture is always blameworthy." '282 The concurring Justice also
wrote that "the excessiveness inquiry for statutory in rem forfeitures is
different from the usual excessiveness inquiry."283
First, Mr. Justice Scalia noted that the issue of whether forfeitures
constitute punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes does not
depend on the owner's culpability. 4 Perhaps Justice Scalia's best
argument on this point was the following: "If the Court is correct that
culpability of the owner is essential, then there is no difference (except
perhaps the burden of proof) between the traditional in rem forfeiture
and the traditional in personam forfeiture. '"285
Mr. Justice Scalia also wrote to emphasize how the excessiveness
analysis for in rem forfeitures is unique: In rem forfeitures are
distinguishable from in personam forfeitures because the former are not
based on the value of the penalty relative to the offense, but are based
on the relationship of the property to the offense.286 Justice Scalia
provided an example of scales used to weigh illegal drugs in prepara-
tion for sale; such scales would be subject to forfeiture regardless of
their composition, be it gold or plastic.8 7
But an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the
Eighth Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot
properly be regarded as an instrumentality of the offense-the
building, for example, in which an isolated drug sale happens to
occur. Such a confiscation would be an excessive fine. The
question is not how much the confiscated property is worth, but
whether the confiscated property has a close enough relationship to
the offense.2"8
282. Id. at 2813.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 2814.
285. Id.
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Justice Scalia found justification for this distinction in the common
law-in the case of deodands, for example, in which only the instru-




The Supreme Court was given an early opportunity to comment
on the holding of Austin in Alexander v. United States.2 90 In Alexan-
der, the petitioner was convicted of three offenses that were predicated
on obscenity offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act.291  The petitioner was sentenced to six
years of imprisonment, fined $100,000, and ordered to pay the cost of
prosecution, incarceration, and supervised release.292 The govern-
ment then sought forfeiture of the petitioner's assets related to his
racketeering enterprise. The government was successful in having the
court order the forfeiture of the petitioner's businesses and almost $9
million acquired through racketeering activity.293
The Supreme Court did not consider whether the forfeiture
violated the Excessive Fines Clause.294 However, in remanding to
the court of appeals for determination whether the forfeiture was
excessive the Court stated,
It is somewhat misleading, we think, to characterize the racketeering
crimes for which petitioner was convicted as involving just a few
materials ultimately found to be obscene. Petitioner was convicted
of creating and managing what the District Court described as "an
enormous racketeering enterprise." It is in light of the extensive
criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted through
this racketeering enterprise over a substantial period of time that the
question of whether or not the forfeiture was "excessive" must be
considered.29
289. Id. The law of deodands did not become part of the law of this county; in this country,
it was abolished by the Constitution. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 682 (1974). However, the law of statutory forfeiture is "likely a product of the confluence
and merger of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied
the wrongdoer." Id.
290. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
291. 113 S. Ct. at 2769-70. The RICO Act is codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West 1984
& Supp. 1995).
292. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2775.
295. Id. at 2776 (citations omitted).
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This language is opaque; however, the language might indicate
that a guiding factor in the excessiveness inquiry should be the
connection or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and
the criminal activity. Such an interpretation would be consistent with
Mr. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin. Justice Scalia wrote that the
determinative factor in the excessiveness inquiry is "whether the
confiscated property has a close enough relationship to the of-
fense." '296 His nexus test would thus constitutionalize the "substan-
tial connection" test.
The federal courts are thus left with two tests: (1) a value test
that compares the value of the property forfeited against the nature of
the offense or the amount needed to effectuate the legitimate remedial
purposes of the forfeiture; and (2) a nexus test that asks whether the
property has a close enough relationship to the offense.297  The
federal courts are split as to the applicable test, with some courts
applying both tests to uphold forfeitures,298 and other courts applying
only Mr. Justice Scalia's test.299
In applying the value test, a court compares the value of the
property forfeited to the criminal punishment that the property owner
might have received. If the value of the property forfeited is not
grossly disproportionate to the criminal punishment the owner might
have received, the court will uphold the forfeiture.00
In applying the nexus test, a court simply asks whether the
property has a sufficiently close relationship to the conduct justifying
forfeiture. The sole inquiry appears to be Mr. Justice Scalia's isolated
incident test: A piece of property does not have a sufficiently close
relationship with conduct justifying forfeiture if the property was not
used for illegal activity on a regular or frequent basis; an isolated
incident is insufficient.0 1
296. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815.
297. United States v. 429 South Main Street, 843 F. Supp. 337, 341 (S.D. Ohio 1993), affd
in part, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995).
298. United States v. 11869 Westshore Drive, 848 F. Supp. 107, 111 (E.D. Mich. 1994),
affd, 70 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 1995); 429 South Main Street, 843 F. Supp. at 341-42 (applying both
the value test and the nexus test).
299. United States v. Myers, 21 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 742
(1995); United States v. 427 & 429 Hall Street, 842 F. Supp. 1421, 1429-30 (M.D. Ala. 1994);
United States v. 2828 North 54th Street, 829 F. Supp. 1071, 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (only
applying Justice Scalia's nexus test).
300. See, e.g., 11869 Westshore Drive, 848 F. Supp. at 111; 429 South Main Street, 843 F.
Supp. at 341-42 (applying value test).
301. See, e.g., Myers, 21 F.3d at 831 (holding that forfeiture of property was not
disproportionate when property provided location and ideal concealment of marijuana growing
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The value test does not make sense in the civil forfeiture context
when the property owner has not already been convicted of the
underlying offense. A court cannot meaningfully compare the value of
the property forfeited with whatever punishment the property owner
might have received had he been convicted, when that property owner
has not been accorded the due process guarantees inherent in a
criminal prosecution, or when he has been accorded these guarantees
but has been acquitted.
The value test also does not make sense in the civil forfeiture
context for the reasons summarized by the United States District Court
for the Central District of California in United States v. 6625 Zumirez
Drive.3 °2 In 6625 Zumirez Drive, the United States argued that the
proper test was set out in Solem v. Helm.3°3 In Solem, the Supreme
Court set out a three-prong analysis for determining whether a
particular punishment violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.3"4 Under Solem, the factors were (1) the gravity of the
offense compared with the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences
imposed in the same jurisdiction for similar crimes; and (3) the
sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the commission of the
same crime. 30 3
The 6625 Zumirez Drive court rejected the Solem analysis. The
court recognized that the Solem factors are guidelines for evaluating
whether a punishment violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, not the Excessive Fines Clause,30 6 and stated that when the
Austin Court explicitly declined to establish a test for analyzing the
Excessive Fines Clause, it implied that the lower courts are not bound
by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause guidelines.3 7 Further,
the 6625 Zumirez Drive court recognized that another recent Supreme
Court decision casts doubt on Solem's continuing viability.0 8
Westshore Drive, 848 F. Supp. at 111 (holding two sales within short period of time sufficient; use
of house as "sales office" and barn as "warehouse" sufficient); 429 South Main Street, 843 F.
Supp. at 342 (finding isolated incident insufficient; repeated use of property for illegal activity
sufficient); 427 & 429 Hall Street, 842 F. Supp. at 1430 (finding sale of drugs out of grocery store
sufficient to make store guilty); 2828 North 54th Street, 829 F. Supp. at 1073 (finding substantial
drug manufacturing operation at property sufficient).
302. 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
303. 463 U.S. 277 (1983), overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
304. Id. at 290-92.
305. Id.
306. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. at 731.
307. Id.
308. Id. The Supreme Court decision referred to is Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
965 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) ("Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee."); id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., joined by
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
Finally, and most significantly, the 6625 Zumirez Drive court
found that only the first of the three Solem factors can be applied in
the Excessive Fines context because a meaningful comparison of the
value of property with the criminal penalty that could be imposed for
that act in the same and other jurisdictions is nearly impossible.3"
This analysis requires the court to calculate a sentence for the owner
as if the owner was convicted of a crime for which the owner has not
been convicted.31 Even if the court could calculate a sentence, no
reason exists to use this as a guide under a civil forfeiture scheme
because Congress has seen fit to punish drug-related activities through
two different devices: (1) a criminal statute imposing imprisonment
and fines, and (2) a civil statute imposing forfeiture. One is not
intended to mitigate the effects of the other."
The 6625 Zumirez Drive court fashioned a new three pronged test
attempting to "give renewed significance to the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause and ... have the added benefit of checking the
government's potential for abusive use of the civil forfeiture stat-
utes. '312  The three prongs are: (1) the inherent gravity of the
offense compared with the harshness of the penalty; (2) whether the
property was an integral part of the commission of the crime; and (3)
whether the criminal activity involving the defendant's property was
extensive in terms of time or spatial use or both.313
The 6625 Zumirez Drive court's test is highly appealing, especially
the second and third prongs of the analysis, which evolve "from the
traditional notion that in rem forfeitures are based on the legal fiction
that 'the thing is primarily considered the offender."'314  However,
the first prong needlessly confuses the analysis and contradicts what
the court earlier identified as problematic in the Solem analysis. How
can a court weigh the harshness of the penalty against the gravity of
the offense, when the property owner might not have been found guilty
of the offense under the criminal law, with its procedural protections?
To its credit, the 6625 Zumirez Drive court acknowledged that a
O'Connor and Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (limiting Solem's
applicability, explaining that "intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate
only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality").
309. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. at 731-32.
310. Id. at 732.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 735.
313. Id. at 732.
314. Id. at 734 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511
(1921)).
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claimant, charged and acquitted of the underlying offense, "cannot be
treated 'as if he had committed [the] offense for purposes of evaluating
the gravity of his conduct."31  However, simply focusing on the
property's guilt in the fashion suggested by Justice Scalia would
constitutionalize a proportionality test that would be relatively easy to
administer and that would prevent abuses by local, state, and federal
governments.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF AUSTIN
Austin is the most important civil forfeiture case of the 1992-93
Supreme Court term because it imposes a substantive restriction on the
government's power to forfeit property. If Mr. Justice Scalia is correct,
the government will no longer be able to forfeit huge tracts of land
when only a portion of the land was used to traffic drugs. Case names
such as United States v. 107.9 Acres will practically disappear from case
name indices. To paraphrase Justice Scalia, the building in which an
isolated drug sale happens to occur will no longer be susceptible to
forfeiture because such a confiscation would be an excessive fine.
The other civil forfeiture cases decided by the Supreme Court in
the 1992-93 term have less potential to significantly limit the govern-
ment's power to seize and forfeit property. In United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property,316 the Court held that before the govern-
ment can seize real property, it must give the property owner notice
and an opportunity to be heard.317 However, the Court's holding
was limited to real estate,31 and, as Mr. Justice Thomas pointed out
in his dissent, notice and opportunity to be heard will avail the
property owner little in most circumstances.319 The holding of James
Daniel Good Real Property does not change the allocation of burdens
in civil forfeiture proceedings; the government still need only show
probable cause to seize the property.32 Even the majority in James
Daniel Good Real Property minimized the significance of its holding,
writing that "[r]equiring the Government to postpone seizure until
after an adversary hearing creates no significant administrative
burden. ' 321  The Court also explained that the government can
prevent the sale of property prior to seizure simply by filing a notice
315. Id. at 733.
316. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
317. Id. at 505.
318. Id.
319. See id. at 516.
320. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b)(4) (West Supp. 1995).
321. 114 S. Ct. at 504.
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of lis pendens.322 Thus, James Daniel Good Real Property is a less
significant decision than Austin.
In the 1992-93 term, the Supreme Court also decided United
States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue3 23 and Republic National Bank of
Miami v. United States.3 24 In 92 Buena Vista Avenue, the Court held
that the innocent owner defense is available to people who acquire
interests in property after the acts giving rise to the property forfeiture
under Section 881 were committed. 32' The United States argued that
Section 881(h) prevented a person who acquired the later interest from
being considered an owner for purposes of the innocent owner
defense.326  The Court disagreed, writing that the government's
argument "would effectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in
almost every imaginable case in which proceeds could be forfeited. It
seems unlikely that Congress would create a meaningless defense.-
327
In Republic National Bank of Miami, the Court considered
whether a federal court could continue to exercise jurisdiction in an in
rem civil forfeiture proceeding after the res, the thing that was
proceeded against, was reduced to cash and deposited in the United
States Treasury.328 The government argued that because the res was
deposited into the United States Treasury, it could no longer be
reached, and funds in the treasury can only be released by Congressio-
nal appropriation.3 29 The Court declined to adopt the government's
position, holding that a federal court retains jurisdiction in such a
circumstance.3 Mr. Justice White, concurring, wrote that he was
"surprised that the Government would take such a transparently fal-
lacious position." '331
Neither 92 Buena Vista Avenue nor Republic National Bank of
Miami poses the sort of threat to the government's current civil
forfeiture proceedings that Austin poses. 92 Buena Vista Avenue simply
preserves the innocent owner defense; it does not impose any new
constraint on the government's forfeiture powers.332  Nor does
Republic National Bank of Miami constrain the government; it simply
322. Id. at 503.
323. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993)
324. 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992).
325. See 113 S. Ct. at 1137.
326. See id. at 1134.
327. Id. at 1135.
328. 113 S. Ct. at 556.
329. Id. at 560.
330. Id. at 562.
331. Id. at 563.
332. See 113 S. Ct. at 1137.
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preserves the right of appeal when forfeited property has already been
converted into cash and deposited in the treasury. 3
Given the above, the question becomes not so much whether Mr.
Justice Scalia is right, but whether the Justice is correct. His argument
that the touchstone of the inquiry is the relation of the property to the
offense relies on the irrelevance of the owner's culpability.3 4  The
excessiveness inquiry in cases dealing with in personam fines asks
whether the fine relates to the offense.33  The in rem excessiveness
inquiry must be different, Justice Scalia reasoned, if the offense "is not
relevant to the forfeiture." '336  However, the majority in Austin
reasoned that the culpability of the owner is always relevant, in the
sense that forfeiture must be understood as punishment of the owner
of the property.337 Thus, the Scalia analysis stresses the importance
of the character of the in rem proceeding, a distinction on which the
majority refuses to place much reliance.33
However, Mr. Justice Scalia's instrumentality inquiry resonates
with familiar principles and precepts. In in rem forfeiture actions, the
property is still considered the wrongdoer. 9 The majority opinion
was unwilling to go so far as to abolish this ancient distinction.3 4
Because the majority was unwilling to transform the fundamental
nature of in rem actions, Justice Scalia's analysis will likely take root in
the jurisprudence of in rem forfeitures. Ironically, the fiction of in rem
forfeiture, which was developed primarily to expand the reach of the
courts, 341 will probably end up doing so again-with the concomitant
result of limiting Congress' powers.
V. CONCLUSION
In Section 881, Congress created a civil forfeiture statute that
grants enormous power to the United States to seize and forfeit the
property of citizens, guilty or innocent, whose property has a sufficient
connection to illegal drug activity. Section 881 is only one example,
among many, of such extensive power. The power has undoubtedly
been abused on occasion, and will certainly be abused again in the
333. See 113 S. Ct. at 561-62.
334. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814.
335. Id. at 2814-15.
336. Id. at 2815.
337. See id. at 2808-12.
338. See id. at 2808-09 n.9.
339. See id. at 2808-09.
340. See id. at 2806-12.
341. Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami, 113 S. Ct. at 559.
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future. Courts and legislatures should not countenance the forfeiture
of property that is not instrumental in the commission of a drug or
other offense. Mr. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin would control
the scope and extent of civil forfeiture.
In the civil forfeiture context, as in many others, government
overreaching is the rule rather than the exception. Congress should
have expected as much when it reformed the drug forfeiture laws in
1984, giving law enforcement agencies more incentive to seize and
forfeit property. Forfeiture delivers billions of dollars worth of
property to prosecutors and police every year. There is very little
oversight of the disposition of this property. Surely current excesses
cannot be countenanced either by Congress or by the courts.
Meaningful proportionality review is one avenue out of this dilemma,
and Mr. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin shows lower courts the
way.
The forfeiture of property should be made more difficult. The
threats posed to individual liberty are too grave; private property rights
must be preserved. When private property rights are no longer
respected in our constitutional scheme, the end of freedom as we know
it may be near.
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